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Abstract
We examine the Tree of Life (TOL) as an evolutionary hypothesis and a heuristic. The original TOL hypothesis has
failed but a new “statistical TOL hypothesis” is promising. The TOL heuristic usefully organizes data without positing
fundamental evolutionary truth.
Reviewers: This article was reviewed by W. Ford Doolittle, Nicholas Galtier and Christophe Malaterre.
“And after a while you’ll hear a deep voice saying,
“Neighbor, how stands the Union?” Then you better
answer the Union stands as she stood, rock-bot-
tomed and copper sheathed, one and indivisible, or
he’s liable to rear right out of the ground.”
The Devil and Daniel Webster (Stephen Vincent
Benet, 1937)
“On a huge hill,
Cragged, and steep, Truth stands, and he that will
Reach her, about must and about must go”
Satire III (John Donne, written 1593-1600)
Looking back to go beyond the Tree of Life
One might think that there is nothing further that could
be said about the last decades of debate on the Tree of
Life (TOL). There is certainly no need to recapitulate
the numerous overviews of these debates as they set out
the positions of key participants (e.g., [1-3]). However,
as the pageantry of 2009’s “Darwin Year” subsides, it
seems to be an appropriate time to reflect on where
TOL studies are headed in relation to the legacies on
which they draw. We will consider two key issues: the
specific effects of these debates on the conceptual fra-
meworks of TOL studies, and how these frameworks are
actually used. We will discuss whether they function as
hypotheses or heuristics. To put it in a deliberately
over-simplified way, it seems useful to examine two
basic questions:
• What are reasonable interpretations of the TOL in
the postgenomic era?
• What is the utility of the TOL for research in evo-
lutionary biology and perhaps beyond?
The legacy
The natural starting point for thinking about the TOL is
Darwin’s explication of its metaphorical power in On
the Origin of Species.
“The affinities of all the beings of the same class
have sometimes been represented by a great tree. I
believe this simile largely speaks the truth. The
green and budding twigs may represent existing spe-
cies; and those produced during each former year
may represent the long succession of extinct species.
... As buds give rise by growth to fresh buds, and
these, if vigorous, branch out and overtop on all
sides many a feebler branch, so by generation I
believe it has been with the great Tree of Life, which
fills with its dead and broken branches the crust of
the earth, and covers the surface with its ever
branching and beautiful ramifications” [4].
In subsequent revisions of his central ideas, Darwin
did not make more concrete how to conceptualize or
construct the TOL. Despite the appeal of other aspects
of Darwinian thinking for many biologists of the era, the
TOL did not immediately stimulate many efforts to
represent the totality of organismal history in the form
of evolutionarily connected branches. One notable
exception was Ernst Haeckel’s depiction of a universal
TOL on the basis of a three-domain genealogy of
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Protista (including Monera), Animalia and Plantae [5].
However, the stage-like evolutionary relationships inher-
ent in Haeckel’s phylogeny, coupled with older religious
connotations of TOL imagery, appear to have inhibited
the scientific uptake of his universal tree [6-8]. Even
subsequently, the classification of organisms continued
primarily as a taxonomical rather than an evolutionary
activity, with branching patterns of specific lineages sim-
ply being derived from existing taxonomical schemata
[9-11,8]. This situation continued well into the twentieth
century despite the advent of the “new systematics” in
the 1940 s. “Our phylogenies are invented to account
for our taxonomic facts or theories”, grumbled botanist
Harry Allan [12]. Nevertheless, the TOL as a general
unifying representation of the totality of specific phylo-
genies persisted, even if it was not realized in practice.
The development of contemporary phylogenetic
methods in the 1960s and 70s, especially the forma-
lized principles of cladistics, resulted in a revolution in
phylogenetic practice. However, for evolutionary
microbiology, this transformation mattered very little.
It took the combination of these phylogenetic methods
with an even more revolutionary source of data –
molecular sequences – to bring microbes and particu-
larly prokaryotes into the embrace of a Darwinian sys-
tem of classification. Once universal characters were
available for all organisms, the Darwinian vision of a
universal representation of all life and its evolutionary
history suddenly became a realistic possibility. Increas-
ing reference was made to this universal, molecule-
based phylogeny as the “comprehensive” tree of the
“entire spectrum of life” [13-17].
However, somewhat paradoxically, the very process of
building phylogenies with molecules revealed the extent
of horizontal gene transfer (HGT), and thereby threa-
tened the TOL concept in regard to its core ideas of a
unique ever-bifurcating branching pattern. Inter- and
intra-species reticulation was a problem even when lim-
ited genetic datasets were available, but became a major
issue with the advent of genomics in the 1990s. While
genomic data has massively enabled comparative evolu-
tionary analyses of microbes [18]), it has simultaneously
exposed the mosaic nature of archaeal and bacterial
genomes and the sheer amount of HGT that has
occurred over the course of evolution (e.g., [19-22].
Although this reticulation is most extensive in the evo-
lution of prokaryotes, eukaryotes have also increasingly
been caught in the act [23-26]. The comparative infre-
quency of HGT in the eukaryote part of the biological
world means, however, that in this case the conceptual
implications for the TOL might not be as drastic: the
evolutionary histories of many eukaryotes appear to pro-
duce tree-like patterns (e.g., [27]). However, by defini-
tion, the TOL is supposed to be the tree of all life and
all evolution, so it is conceptually and epistemically mis-
leading to discount non-tree-like evolution when such
processes occur in the majority of life-forms and history
of life
In response to the predicament of the prokaryote
part of the TOL, researchers have positioned them-
selves in conceptual camps in regard to how they deal
with the challenge of HGT [1,3]. While according
greater or lesser importance to HGT is one way to
approach prokaryote evolution, a more constructive
stance may be conceivable now that methods and con-
cepts have developed even further. In what follows, we
attempt to identify the conceptual frameworks and
epistemological strategies deployed in evolutionary
studies as responses to the deluge of data produced by
genomics and metagenomics, and to show how these
strategies have produced revised understandings of the
TOL. Throughout this article, we strive to distinguish
clearly between the ongoing discussions of the ontolo-
gical status of the TOL (concerned with what it is)
and the epistemological strategies in TOL research
(concerned with how TOL knowledge is produced and
how it can be used in other research). These two per-
spectives on the TOL have often been conflated but
we attempt to show why it is worthwhile to separate
them.
Conceptual frameworks: Reinterpreting the TOL
Many substantial advances have been made in phyloge-
netic methods, including the development of sophisti-
cated evolutionary models, tree-building techniques
(including faster tools suited to the analysis of genome-
wide data sets) and reliability estimates of tree infer-
ences, as well as databases and other computational
tools. In this section, we are primarily concerned with
the concepts that underpin these methods and their
respective results. Specifically, our focus is how the TOL
has been reconceptualized in light of the fact that the
more molecular data is analysed, the more difficult it is
to interpret straightforwardly the evolutionary histories
of those molecules. Rather than renouncing the univer-
sal tree, many evolutionary biologists have instead
elected to restructure their understanding of the TOL in
relation to bodies of data and what can be done with
them. We will outline a variety of positions that encom-
pass an ever more extensive range of modifications to
the basic TOL concept (Figure 1). These stances range
from “business as usual” on the basis of finding clear
signals of the one true TOL, to a perspective in which
local trees are seen as just occasional structures in the
“real” web of life. All these positions draw on Darwin’s
tree metaphor, and they also overlap and feed into one
another in various ways, but each commands a distinct
conceptual space for itself.
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1. Trees of genes as trees of species
Trees of gene and protein sequences are typically con-
sidered most valuable when they can be justified as
representing trees of species. To achieve this representa-
tional status, a gene or a set of genes have to meet
some criteria of genealogical markers. The first two
related criteria are the most obvious ones: i) a gene has
to be (nearly) universal, i.e., represented by readily
recognizable orthologs (preferably single-copy) in all cel-
lular life forms; ii) the sequence of the gene in question
has to be sufficiently conserved to allow the construc-
tion of an unambiguous alignment and an informative
tree. The third criterion is more controversial and
harder to apply: a gene used for the construction of a
reference tree has to be minimally prone to HGT.
Genes favoured under these criteria include those for
ribosomal RNA, ribosomal proteins, elongation factors,
RNA polymerases and several other (nearly) universal,
highly conserved genes [28,29]. A few of these markers
are considered to be so evolutionarily “special” that they
have become the basis of reference trees for the whole
TOL [30,15]. The problems of the most well known
reference trees, the trees of 16S and 18S rRNA genes,
have been frequently discussed (e.g., [31,32]). Neverthe-
less, for many evolutionary biologists, the concept of a
reference tree can still be justified as long as its limita-
tions are understood (e.g., [33]).
However, researchers – even if they continue to use
reference trees – increasingly recognize that single-
gene trees, and even composite multi-gene trees, might
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Figure 1 Conceptual frameworks of the TOL in relation to Darwin’s tree simile.
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obscure more than they reveal. These trees cannot take
into account non-bifurcating patterns from major evo-
lutionary events, such as endosymbiosis, co-evolving
symbioses, hybridization and any other occurrences of
lineage fusion [34-37]. More generally, HGT is now
recognized as a major factor of evolution in the pro-
karyote world. Treating all these non-tree-like pro-
cesses as problems that obscure the “true” TOL greatly
skews and limits the understanding of evolutionary his-
tory that is one of the central goals of evolutionary
biology – along with understanding processes and pat-
terns of evolution [38].
The second way of relating gene trees to species
trees is to think of the gene trees as contained “within”
the species tree. This route is particularly attractive for
the systematics of organisms for which there is already
a widely accepted phylogenetic placement in the TOL
(primarily multicellular eukaryotes), but it has also had
appeal for prokaryote phylogenetics. An obvious pro-
blem is that the species tree has to be “predetermined”
in order to pick and construct the right gene trees (e.
g., [39,40]), and this makes the phylogeny circularly
presuppose its conclusion. However, as with the pre-
vious conceptual relationship between gene and species
trees, discordance between trees for individual genes –
not just in prokaryotes, and not just because of HGT
– has also led to fundamental questions about whether
gene trees could be simply understood as tracing a his-
tory “within” a known species tree [41-43]. “In consid-
ering these issues”, wrote phylogeneticist Wayne
Maddison,
“one is provoked to consider precisely what is phylo-
geny. Perhaps it is misleading to view some gene
trees as agreeing and other gene trees as disagreeing
with the species tree; rather, all of the gene trees are
part of the species tree, which can be visualized like
a fuzzy statistical distribution, a cloud of gene his-
tories“ [41].
Rather than gene trees being contained within spe-
cies trees or standing in for them, new concepts of the
TOL and of evolutionary history in general began to
be articulated with the increasing availability of com-
parative genomic data. Because the species tree is gen-
erally perceived as the true aim of phylogeny (or at
least used to be until recently), new modelling techni-
ques have been devised and broader treatments of data
developed in order to represent the species tree less
problematically. Given the abundance of molecular
data, a major investment has been made in attempts to
reconstruct trees of genomes. In the process, the very
concept of “species tree” (and thus TOL) has been
revised.
2. Trees of genomes as trees of cells
Under the broad banner of phylogenomics, efforts to
reconcile inconsistent data and resolve the branching
order of all lineages of life have been developed and
championed [44]. Phylogeneticists are obliged to believe
that traces of vertical signal can be detected amongst
the evolutionary noise (although these very categories
imply certain expectations) and so are torn between
interpreting such signal as the central truth of the evo-
lutionary history or as an indication of limited genetic
relatedness that is not necessarily central to our under-
standing of evolution. A major outcome of the attempts
to understand the relationship between putative signal
and noise in genomic data has been the generation of
new concepts of the TOL. While there are several meth-
odological routes involved [45,46]), two streams of gen-
ome tree construction illustrate this tension due to their
substantially different underlying ways of thinking about
the TOL.
Core genome approaches are concerned with an evo-
lutionarily stable core of genes that can be taken to
represent the organismal lineage, which is seen as the
process of binary genome replication and cell division
(thus justifying the tenet of bifurcation). In accordance
with the previously mentioned criteria for the choice of
reference genes, this approach seeks to identify genes
that are widely represented in genomes, and most
importantly, that produce congruent phylogenetic sig-
nals (e.g., [47-52]). A degree of success has been
achieved under this conceptual framework (different
methods may be employed), with the identification of
universal genes that appear to track the same evolution-
ary story. There are many questions, however, about
whether the trees generated for this purpose, particularly
concatenated sequence trees, are methodological arte-
facts [53], and whether such analyses say much about
the TOL or simply produce a partially distorted history
of several genes.
Perhaps the biggest problem with such an approach is
how well the identified cores represent the evolutionary
history of the organisms and genomes that contain
them. The (nearly) universal gene core of cellular life is
extremely small and functionally skewed. One much
scrutinized core analysis examined genomes of 191 spe-
cies from all three domains of life but was able to iden-
tify only 31 universal genes, primarily, those for
ribosomal proteins [54]. Prokaryote genomes typically
contain between 1,000 and 4000 genes, so any tree built
on the basis of 31 genes is a highly reduced representa-
tion of the intended TOL – “a tree of 1%” in a famously
trenchant criticism [36]. More generally, the fact that all
genes in prokaryote genomes are likely to have experi-
enced at least one HGT event in the 3.5 billion year his-
tory of cellular genomes means that no pristinely
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untransferred core exists [55]. The core approach might,
therefore, be better interpreted as concerned with a
“least transferred” subset of genes. In that case, the core
would be a “fuzzy” gene set displaying a particular statis-
tical trend, rather than a precisely defined set, and this
is the conceptual space another version of the genome-
based TOL inhabits.
Central trend approaches are built on the quantifica-
tion of more and less transfer. They combine individual
trees of genes in order to foreground vertical tree pat-
terns against the much more complicated backdrop of
the “forest” of life [56-60]. Such conceptualizations fac-
tor in the pervasiveness of HGT but search for an indi-
cative message of vertical descent from the composite
data. This trend, composed of the most universal signal,
can usually be picked up only faintly at deep phyloge-
netic levels, except for the signal of bifurcation between
archaea and bacteria [57]. It may not be possible, ulti-
mately, to recover any other details of deep branching
and even tree tips may remain in doubt for some
lineages [55,61,62]. Nevertheless, for some of these
supertree constructions, a “modal information” TOL
seems to emerge strongly enough to be a “backbone”
tree that is merely draped with some fine “cobwebs” of
HGT [60].
While none of these analyses see the central trend as
the majority signal in the forest, they do recognize it as
an extremely important one. In one case, when using a
specially designed “tree-net trend” score, the central
tree-like trend amounts to approximately 40% of the
total information on prokaryote evolution [58]. But is
such a “statistical tree” what is traditionally meant by
the TOL? This was certainly not how the TOL was con-
ceived in the first era of molecular phylogeny before the
recognition that different genes might have distinct evo-
lutionary histories. The statistical TOL approach also
involves the acknowledgement that averaging out the
signal from different gene trees may produce artefactual
trees while obscuring relevant aspects of evolution [63].
The willingness to make this transition may have more
to do with the perceived epistemological function of the
TOL (which we explore below), than with commitments
to the ontology of the tree (e.g., its “realness”).
Trees of cells in light of trees of genomes
Challenges to the TOL have caused many builders of
genome trees to conceive differently of their reconstruc-
tive aims. Rather than seeing the TOL exclusively as a
tree of species, based on trees of genes, the TOL has
been appealed to as a tree of organisms or a tree of cells
(e.g., [49,57,64-67]). The justification for refocusing TOL
efforts in this direction is that the history of life is, as
Darwin knew, a history of bifurcating cell divisions as
well as one of genome replication (which he didn’t
know). If the TOL topology is taken to represent the
history of cell divisions, then it can conveniently be con-
ceived as the organismal backdrop against which the
web-like intricacies of genome evolution can be exam-
ined (e.g., [49,51]). For core genome proponents, the
tree of cells concept means that incongruence between
individual gene trees is diminished in evolutionary
importance even if it continues to pose methodological
problems. The aim of phylogeny can still be seen as
accessing the “true” history of organisms without being
distracted by the aberrant history of some parts of the
genome [51]. Some core advocates go so far as to pro-
claim that the cell-based conception of the species tree
would be valuable even if it were incongruent with
every single constructed gene tree (e.g., [68]). They do
assume, however, that many gene trees will, in fact, be
reconciled with the “supposedly known” species tree
[52,68]). This use of the tree-of-cells concept revives the
original problem of conceptualizing gene trees as repre-
senting or contained by species trees. It requires the
assumption and circular reasoning that the species tree
(now disguised as a tree of cells) is already available
whereas one of the major purposes of constructing and
comparing gene trees (for prokaryotes at least) is to
infer the species tree.
From the central trend perspective, the tree of cells is
not concretely envisaged as true history that in some
way operates as a reference tree. What the tree of cells
conception is doing for this group of phylogeneticists is
mediating the construction of genome trees and species
trees by making another stepping stone of inference.
The argument is based on a claim that tree thinking is
inherent in biology because the replication of genetic
material is itself inherently tree-like [69]. Under this
view, even when the incongruence between numerous
gene trees is taken into account, genes can still be con-
sidered as fundamental units of evolution. Accordingly,
the goal of phylogenetics – in this context perhaps more
appropriately denoted phylogenomics – is perceived as
deciphering any signs of distinct structure that might
exist in the “phylogenetic forest of life” (i.e., the com-
pendium of all gene trees). Despite the complications of
finding appropriate methods, some of these trends are
taken to represent vertical descent, a concept on which
this approach and phylogenetics more generally con-
tinue to rely [57,58].
3. Webs of genomes and trees of genes
A growing response to the difficulties in prokaryote phy-
logeny is to embrace the view that there is no universal
tree that subordinates all other evolutionary patterns.
Trees for individual genes or possibly sets of genes may
exist, from this viewpoint, but only as partial representa-
tions of much more complex evolutionary processes,
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especially in the prokaryotic world [70,71]. The most
radical position is that hierarchical patterns and appar-
ent phylogenetic congruence may result from non-tree-
like processes (i.e., systematically biased HGT), and that
at the very least, this alternative needs to be explored
[72-75]. The last several years have seen considerable
effort put into the development of network models and
representations of their outputs (e.g., [76,71,63]). Repre-
sentation is a major problem for such approaches, with
the complexity of many networks requiring that certain
data or processes are filtered out just for the network to
make interpretable sense [77].
In the face of all this effort in reconceptualizing the
evolutionary process, the problem persists of whether
making too many theoretical concessions to the exis-
tence and widespread nature of HGT undermines the
very aim of phylogenetics and systematics, and thereby
prematurely forecloses on a better understanding of the
relationships between microbes, the TOL, and evolution
in general. We think this question is central to the
debates and developments of the last decade, and the
theme of this collection of papers in Biology Direct,
“Beyond the Tree of Life”, could just as well be framed
as a question. But what makes the debate persist and
continue to offer important points of discussion may be
due as much to how the TOL is conceived to function
in the research it inspires as to how it can be elucidated
in the context of evolving biological entities.
The role of evolutionary trees and the TOL in
creating knowledge
The TOL has obviously undergone a number of concep-
tual transformations as it has encountered new data and
methods. As a core or central trend, for example, the
TOL is quite far from early molecular TOL concepts, in
which vertical descent by gradual modification was the
supposition governing analysis of the data. But it is not
just the representational status of the TOL that has
changed – from trees of genes as trees of species, to
trees of genomes as trees of cells, to trees as special net-
works – but its very epistemological status. Phylogeny
in general has made major shifts over the last decades.
Throughout the 80s and 90s, and into the 2000s, the
understanding of what molecules could do for phylo-
geny moved from a role as tools that could test existing
theories about evolutionary relationships to becoming
the substance of evolutionary analysis and the source of
novel hypotheses about the evolutionary history of
organisms [78].
From one point of view, the extent of these epistemolo-
gical and conceptual transformations suggests that evolu-
tionary biologists or at least investigators of microbial
evolution should see the TOL as a ladder to be kicked
away. As a conceptual prop and an epistemological tool,
the TOL has taken its users as far as it could, and further
habitual use will be merely misleading, say Ford Doolittle
and Eric Bapteste [70]. According to this view, network-
based approaches should replace the TOL in order to
understand the evolutionary history of groups of organ-
isms [79]. The force of this argument depends, however,
on how the TOL is being used and whether any of those
uses can be justified.
As we noted in earlier, a distinction should be made
between the epistemology of the TOL and its ontology,
or nature of its existence in the world. Quite frequently,
the two are conflated: the postulated existence of the
TOL means that it must be straightforwardly justified as
knowledge. Richard Dawkins illustrates this conflation
with his usual panache:
“For there is, after all, one true tree of life, the
unique pattern of evolutionary branchings that actu-
ally happened. It exists. It is in principle knowable.
We don’t know it all yet. By 2050 we should – or if
we do not, we shall have been defeated only at the
terminal twigs, by the sheer number of species” [80].
But, at least as far as prokaryote evolution goes, it is
obvious that representing it in the form of the “one true
tree of life” will be very difficult, if not impossible, and
that parts of the TOL may never be justifiably extracted
from the range of evolutionary signals that can be
detected [71,81]. Even when a tree-like central trend is
detected in the “forest of life”, it is recognized that deep
internal branches tend to be extremely short (the so-
called compressed cladogenesis [CC] model). As noted
by Pugibò et al., “a consistent phylogenetic signal seems
to be discernible throughout the evolution of archaea
and bacteria but, under the CC model, the prospect of
unequivocally resolving the relationships between the
major archaeal and bacterial clades is bleak” [57]. More-
over, given the pivotal role of endosymbiosis accompa-
nied by massive gene transfer from the endosymbiont to
the host, as well as sporadic HGT, representation of the
entire history of eukaryotes as a single tree is not possi-
ble either [82].
What Dawkins does articulate effectively in his state-
ment above are the background assumptions to the idea
of a universal TOL, with the implications that knowing
it is crucial to understand evolution and biodiversity.
This deeply held intuitive conviction holds, as Darwin
did, that all evolution involves groups arising out of
groups, and that every organism should belong to (at
least) one of those groups. While all evolutionists would
accept such claims, they would not agree on how much
of this process can be known, and whether it is the pri-
mary representation that should subordinate all other
evolutionary processes.
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Doubts about the extent to which the TOL can be
known are conjoined with questions about how the
TOL actually functions in evolutionary biology. There
are several candidates for the epistemological role the
TOL plays in evolutionary biology, and these include
the functions of an axiom, a hypothesis or theory, a
model, or a heuristic. We will examine two of these pos-
sibilities with the particular aim of understanding why
the TOL endures despite the evidence against it, and
whether one of these epistemological accounts of the
TOL enables us to understand better the conceptual
transitions and debates that have transformed it over
the last 150 years.
a. The TOL as hypothesis
The TOL, although usually described in general and
unifying terms, may also rendered as a hypothesis. Ford
Doolittle and Eric Bapteste describe the TOL as a
hypothesis and go on to point to its apparent weak-
nesses in regard to standard expectations about hypoth-
eses [70,79,83]. Although they also mention that the
TOL is a “model”, and a “heuristic epistemological
model”, their main characterization includes qualities
routinely associated with hypotheses, namely testability
and falsifiability [70]. They see the TOL as a hypothesis
composed of three connected propositions: natural
selection (and potentially other processes) drives modifi-
cation, descent occurs with modification, and hierarchi-
cal patterns are produced by that process. Because of its
multi-propositional nature, it also appears sensible to
view this account of the TOL as a model (the distinction
between models and hypotheses is not important for our
discussion here, but can be useful in other contexts, e.g.,
[84]) or a theory. However, because broader theoretical
statements need to be dealt with as specifically testable
claims, we will accept the designation of hypothesis for
the way in which phylogeneticists have tended to treat
TOL claims.
Doolittle and Bapteste’s criticism of the TOL is not on
the grounds that it is a hypothesis, but that it has not
been sufficiently treated as one. They believe that the
refutation of the TOL hypothesis has not been accorded
enough attention, and that starting with Darwin, the his-
torical wielder of the TOL, researchers have used the
data to be explained (the apparent hierarchy of the rela-
tionships between organisms) as evidence of the expla-
nation (the hierarchical branching structure of life as a
consequence of descent with modification).
“The body of data (the explanandum) for which a
hypothesis (the explanans) proposes to account can-
not at the same time constitute proof for that
hypothesis, nor can further data of the same kind”
[70].
Put even more emphatically, TOL logic can be
phrased as “natural classifications are tree-like because
the process that produces the characters on which they
are based are tree-like” (see Review 1 below). According
to Doolittle and Bapteste, this circularity means that
proper testing has been abandoned, and that the diffi-
culties with the TOL in modern phylogenetics can be
attributed to the fact that it has not been duly treated as
a hypothesis. If it had been, Doolittle and Bapteste con-
tend, then the TOL hypothesis would indeed have been
rejected, and brand new hypotheses formulated and
tested.
This idea of treating tree branches as conjectural
hypotheses is something that cladists enthusiastically
introduced into phylogeny when Hennig’s systematics
was translated linguistically and conceptually into a
broader sphere of phylogenetic systematics. Cladists
have tended to rely heavily on philosopher’s Karl Pop-
per’s ideas of falsification (and corroboration), which has
led to many oversimplifications of scientific practice
[85,86]). One major problem in this equation of hypoth-
esis with falsifiable conjecture is that it is usually not
the case that a hypothesis is abandoned or substituted
when it is “falsified”. Much more commonly, the original
hypothesis is modified to accommodate otherwise con-
flicting findings [87,88]). This is what seems to have
happened to the TOL hypothesis, as findings of HGT
have stretched original expectations of the TOL [1,3].
Indeed, under the “forest of life” approach, the path to
accommodation of the TOL as hypothesis seems
straightforward. We can postulate the existence of gene
trees, which is indeed a natural assumption given the
intrinsic bifurcating character of the replication process
(see above). Then, we can formulate the falsifiable “sta-
tistical TOL” (STOL) hypothesis: is there a single, signif-
icant central trend in the “forest of life”, i.e., a single-
tree topology that is, on average, most similar to other
topologies in the forest? A rigorous test of the unique-
ness of the STOL topology is technically demanding and
still to be performed but preliminary analyses strongly
suggest that such a trend exists [57]. Thus, the accom-
modating STOL hypothesis seems to meet this particu-
lar falsification criterion. Does this approach get rid of
the circularity emphasized by Doolittle and Bapteste?
The answer depends on whether the hypothetical STOL
and the trees for individual genes are treated as data of
the same kind or of different kinds. The latter view
seems reasonable because, as pointed out above, a gene
tree is a natural implication of the bifurcating replica-
tion process but the existence of a STOL does not fol-
low from this assumption in the face of HGT.
Doolittle and Bapteste, if pressed on this point, could
claim that accommodation and expansion are not legiti-
mate ways in which to treat hypotheses, especially when
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doing so relies on circularity between explanans and
explanandum. Circularity has been a frequent problem
for evolutionary biology, and has been a charge made
against the supposed claim that natural selection can be
measured by survival of the fittest [89,90] as well as
against aspects of phylogenetic classification [91]. Philo-
sophers have often discussed Darwin’s reasoning as
“inference to the best explanation”, according to which
explanation comes before inference, and observations
thus legitimately support the hypothesis meant to
explain them [92]. But worries about circularity (even if
avoided by the STOL) might be irrelevant because the
TOL could have another epistemological role, that of a
heuristic, for which the route of inquiry is rather more
complex than hypothesis testing or even inference to
the best explanation.
b. The TOL as heuristic or a tool
For many purposes, the TOL serves as a general meta-
phor of evolutionary relatedness, despite the fact those
relationships cannot be captured by an exclusively bifur-
cating pattern. Even if not strictly justified, the TOL
construed in this way has the capacity to depict and
organize distinctions between cell types, genome struc-
ture, fine-grained genetic architecture, physiology, habi-
tat and many other features that are central to the
evolution of life on earth. From a practical point of
view, the TOL provides a framework in which to order
biological knowledge for both scientific and broader
social purposes. It is a tool with which to explore a
range of phenomena, some of which it identifies and the
rest of which it may indicate cannot be captured by that
particular approach. More specifically, the TOL, all its
limitations notwithstanding, is necessary as a scaffold
for reconstructing scenarios about the evolution of fea-
tures of organisms (such as various functional systems).
Arguably, this is key goal of evolutionary research, and
it is unclear how it can be achieved without using a
tree-like framework. This sort of use could be thought
of as heuristic.
William Whewell, a natural historian who had consid-
erable influence on Darwin’s view of science, is generally
credited with one of the earliest elaborations in English
of the term “heuristic”. Whewell thought that if he
could not ‘treat the Art of Discovery as a kind of Logic,
[he] must take a new name for it, Heuristic’ [93]. He
proposed that heuristics provide scientists with a “bond
of unity by which the phenomena are held together”
with the consequence that the topic may be examined
more closely and formally. Perhaps the most influential
contemporary account of heuristics can be found in the
work of Hungarian mathematician, George Pólya. Pólya
advocated heuristic reasoning in his classic 1945 book,
How to Solve It [94]. He described heuristics as “serving
to discover”, and outlined how such reasoning is “provi-
sional and plausible only” with the aim of discovering
the solution to particular problems. Heuristics, on the
basis of induction or analogy, produce a partial solution
that may become more complete. This way of thinking
has been taken up by various scientific communities,
including computer scientists (e.g., [95]), cognitive scien-
tists and Artificial Intelligence researchers [96].
One of the most useful background sources for under-
standing the TOL as a heuristic comes from Darwin
himself, as he investigated this concept. When he began
to use the metaphor ("simile”) of the TOL, he used it in
a heuristic sense, as a tool or an aid to evolutionary
classification:
’As it is difficult to show the blood-relationship
between the numerous kindred of any ancient and
noble family, even by the aid of a genealogical tree,
and almost impossible to do this without this aid,
we can understand the extraordinary difficulty which
naturalists have experienced in describing, without
the aid of a diagram, the various affinities which
they perceive between the many living and extinct
members of the same great natural class’ [4]
(emphases added).
In this passage, in the final full chapter (Chapter 14)
of The Origin, Darwin is expanding on the nature of
classification in regard to his theory of natural selection.
He is talking about the pragmatic value of understand-
ing descent with modification with the help of genealo-
gical trees. Moreover, Darwin follows Whewell’s
description of hypotheses as
’"of service to science, [even] when they involve a
certain portion of incompleteness, and even of error.
The object of such inventions is to bind together
facts which without them are loose and detached ...
even if they themselves somewhat misstate the
matter.”
[97-99]). But this is not what is understood by hypoth-
esis today, and not what Doolittle and Bapteste meant
when they talked about Darwin’s TOL hypothesis. In
today’s phylogeny, heuristics are discussed almost exclu-
sively in computational terms and hypotheses are more
rigidly defined as propositions that are right or wrong.
Cladism’s addiction to bifurcating logic and falsifiability
[100], on top of the much earlier shift in biology from
natural history to experimentation, is probably the rea-
son that evolutionary heuristics such as the TOL have
been converted into hypotheses to be tested [101]. It is
important to keep in mind that cladist “hypotheses” are
not couched at the TOL level, however, and that it took
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the advent of molecular phylogeny to bring back the
idea of a unifying and unified phylogeny. But as Woese
and other phylogeneticists revived Darwin’s grand pat-
tern of a great tree, they treated it not only as a general
representation of the total evolutionary history of life,
but also as a tool with which to probe heuristically
further molecular data. Thus, the TOL functioned in the
original Darwinian sense as an aid in that it connected
and made general sense of otherwise localized evolu-
tionary relationships.
Some of the revealing residues of this way of thinking
heuristically about the TOL can be found in contempor-
ary statements that expose the TOL function as far
from that of a strictly “falsifiable” hypothesis. For exam-
ple:
“The only way to discover whether HGT could
destroy Darwin’s dream of understanding the great
kingdoms of nature is to assume that it cannot, and
then make every effort to try to determine the tree
of life” [102].
“Whether or not this central trend is denoted a tree
of life could be a matter of convention and conveni-
ence, but the nature of this trend as well as the
other trends that can be discerned in the forest
merit investigation” [57].
In other words, statements such as these leave open
the ontological status of the tree (the nature of its exis-
tence) in favour of treating it as an epistemological tool
that might generate and justify new knowledge. Not
only has the study of the TOL given further reason to
pursue such investigation, but also TOL limitations are
now understood more clearly. Even some strong TOL
advocates are able to agree that any construction of a
universal tree is in fact a heuristic that is useful for
exploring evolutionary patterns and processes.
“In my view, a tree is just a human-made conceptual
tool that we might decide to adopt if it means some-
thing to us, like any other graphical representation,
irrespective of its ‘existence’ in the real world” [103].
This is a conventionalist viewpoint, or one that
accepts the TOL as a pragmatic tool and not a natural
category. Thinking of the TOL as a heuristic allows a
conceptual rapprochement to be forged between TOL
researchers who uphold strong claims about the univer-
sal tree, and network researchers who are opposed to
imposing the TOL globally to represent prokaryote evo-
lution. As one of the latter explains,
“I have no objection to the continued use of an
rRNA tree (or of any other agreed upon averaging
or gene core-based TOCD&S [tree of cell division
and speciation]) as a conventional framework for
classification, provided everyone knows that that is
all that it might be, a conventional taxonomic frame-
work, not the TOL with all its baggage. Other ways
of classifying microbes (for instance by gene content
or ecological role or indeed by relative position in a
multidimensional network) might well have more
predictive value, but still this relatively stable hier-
archical scheme would serve a very useful organizing
function. In fact, I think this is the posture that
many microbiologists have already accepted” [104].
Conceiving of the TOL’s epistemological function as
heuristic fits this pragmatic stance very well. It is a
function that is flexible enough to appeal broadly and
could explain why the TOL is thriving as a research
topic (captured by PubMed abstracts, for example
[105]) notwithstanding the many challenges to its real-
ness and epistemic legitimacy. Rather than being put
off by these problems, evolutionary biologists are
increasingly drawn to efforts to understand broader
swathes of evolutionary relationships. The persistent
appeal of the TOL could also have something to do
with the increased attention to Darwin in 2009 (the
200th anniversary of his birth, and the 150th of the
publication of the Origin), but more important in the
long run is the power of the TOL to probe copious
data, suggest high-level explanations, and make general
sense of the information produced by an explosion of
tools, analyses and models in evolutionary biology.
Heuristics need not explain or capture everything:
their epistemic importance lies in their ability to open
up valuable lines of inquiry.
It is useful to recall that heuristics can be deployed in
a variety of ways. In some cases, the TOL heuristic
might function as a positive probe in which it connects
together local phylogenies; in others it might be used as
a negative heuristic, when researchers use the TOL to
seek phenomena to which it cannot apply (much of the
HGT research, for example). And as we have shown
already, heuristics such as the TOL are not frozen in
epistemic time. As new evolutionary findings and inter-
pretations have arisen from initial heuristic-driven
research, the TOL has accommodated new ways of
probing evolutionary patterns and processes. Today’s
TOL explores molecular and other levels of evolution in
the company of network heuristics. Does this mean the
TOL is too plastic and accommodating a heuristic?
Only in the same way that the human mind is able to
deal with positive and negative findings by adjusting
models and techniques on the basis of preceding success
and failure. In this respect, heuristics embody major fea-
tures of scientific practice and general cognitive activity.
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It is possible that for the more ardent TOL critics,
presenting it as a heuristic may seem like a desperate
strategy that is part and parcel of old and doomed “tree
thinking” [106]. And for many other TOL researchers,
the TOL is something more than a heuristic – it is a
true model or theory that is isomorphic to evolutionary
reality. Thinking of the TOL as a heuristic will not solve
any problems of its application when the TOL is dis-
cussed in these idealized forms but it may help under-
stand why idealizations are not the only way to proceed.
c. Pluralism versus monism
From a more radical point of view, holding the TOL as
hypothesis or heuristic is already part of the problem
because it is deemed to have no singular epistemic sta-
tus, and no privilege as a representation of evolutionary
history. This perspective holds that contemporary
understandings of HGT mean that it is time, finally, to
give up on any “unifying metanarrative” such as the tree
[70], or that it may be appropriate to find an alternative,
such as a Web of Life [79,71] or a Ring of Life [37].
Sometimes couched in terms of the conflict between
pluralist and monist perspectives, the TOL debate is
seen by these proponents as moribund [70]. To replace
tree-thinking, they argue for a more accommodating fra-
mework in which trees are located in a much more
tangled forest, and the emphasis is placed on achieving
a genuine understanding of the forest. Trees are part of
the picture but far less than the main part. This pluralis-
tic perspective also suggests an additional issue of
whether to separate representations and theories of
eukaryote and prokaryote evolution, due to the different
tempos, modes and outcomes of evolution involved
[70,71]. More than one account of evolutionary pro-
cesses and mechanisms may be necessary to encompass
the varieties of evolving life on the Earth.
The trouble with this perspective for many researchers
is that it may be giving up too much because there is no
well-organized or obvious alternative to the TOL, and
piecemeal descriptions of aspects of evolution are con-
ceptually dissatisfying for many biologists. It is possible
that this gap will be filled by “Web of Life” models,
tools and concepts. However, there may still be some
life left in the TOL in regard to how it poses a particu-
lar set of scientific questions and brings together a
diverse community of scientists seeking closer under-
standing of evolutionary processes and relationships. We
think that the variety of ways in which the TOL has
developed, both conceptually and epistemologically,
indicate its continued usefulness. Although ongoing loy-
alty to the TOL is unlikely to be founded primarily on
essential core markers of tree-like evolution, its future
could instead involve much fuzzier conceptualizations
and more flexible epistemological strategies. It is not at
odds with pluralism for researchers to continue to inves-
tigate heuristically aspects of this fuzzy TOL. On the
contrary, it would be anti-pluralist to insist that such
investigations should not proceed.
The future standing of the tree
What does it mean then to talk about going “beyond”
the TOL? The general question that might be raised at
the end of such an overview is whether the TOL is still
relevant. Does it continue to stimulate programmes of
research with novel findings and methodological innova-
tions? And is further debate about the TOL construc-
tive? As we have noted, some of those involved in the
discussions believe it may be time to lay the debate to
rest.
“All sides express confidence in their positions, and
the debate often seems to be at an impasse” [70]
We think that our analysis shows the very opposite of
an impasse. Although in some respects, idealized posi-
tions continue to be articulated, in the main TOL
research – whether skeptical or convinced of the TOL’s
existence, constructability and relevance – is about shift-
ing conceptual frameworks and flexible accounts of what
the TOL is and does. A common basic understanding of
evolution has been profoundly enriched by insights into
the dynamic evolution of genomes, in which a wide
range of processes and entities including diverse mobile
elements and specific mechanisms for HGT play major
roles (e.g., [107-113]). Wrestling with the conceptual
and epistemological function of the TOL has played an
important role in engendering these new ideas.
From a practical perspective, TOL research is an
excellent illustration of a successful research programme
[87]. As a heuristic, it has transformed previous under-
standings, and been conceptually modified along the
way. The TOL not only guides further investigation but
also manages to organize numerous disciplines and
research perspectives. Does “going beyond” the TOL
mean abandoning such progress? We think that reflect-
ing on the TOL’s conceptual and epistemological status
is part of the process by which a research programme
continues to reinvent and transform itself in light of ear-
lier insights. Such reflections also clarify some of the
debate around the TOL. If it is seen as a hypothesis –
something that can be precisely rejected and then aban-
doned forever – it can be the cause of some impatience
that this hasn’t occurred when the basic TOL hypothesis
has been refuted. But if the TOL is understood and used
as a heuristic (and there seem to be many contemporary
instances of this sort of use), then the value of its con-
tinued deployment is such that no mere “falsification”
will get rid of it. Rather, if it continues to advance
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understanding of evolution, even when found wanting or
in need of qualification, then it would be wasteful to dis-
card it. Some of the debate may indeed be symptomatic
of the very different epistemological expectations of the
TOL, rather than the opposition of different conceptual
frameworks.
We hope that our overview shows not only the wealth
of conceptual and epistemic value produced by the
TOL, but also that it illustrates how good science
works. The universal tree is not and has never been
purely about right and wrong facts, but about the prag-
matic knowledge-producing capacity of the TOL frame-
work. The current state of debate indicates that the
TOL still has conceptual and epistemic worth. It may be
fought over, but never announced as a dogma free of
requirements for evidence and demonstration. The TOL
is very much alive in this sense, and we predict its
demise is far from imminent. However, the future of the
TOL is not today’s TOL. Transformations in regard to
concepts and epistemological function are underway
already, and this thematic series on “Beyond the Tree of
Life” will indicate some of them.
Conclusions
The irrefutable demonstration by phylogenomics that
different genes in general have distinct evolutionary his-
tories made obsolete the belief that a phylogenetic tree
of a single universal gene such as rRNA or of several
universal genes could represent the “true” TOL. How-
ever, this irrevocable realization does not immediately
dispose of the TOL, which can be reconceptualized in
at least two distinct ways. First, the TOL can be treated
as an evolutionary hypothesis. The refutation of this
hypothesis in the original, strong form, as a single faith-
ful representation of the evolution of organisms, has
prompted its modification to the “statistical TOL
hypothesis”. The existence of a statistically significant
tree-like trend in the “forest” of individual gene trees is
a testable proposition that still has to be investigated in
detail. Second, the TOL can be deployed as a heuristic
for evolutionary studies in which a tree of just a single
universal gene can be extremely useful as long as one
realizes that it is only a convenient framework for orga-
nizing data rather than a fundamental truth about evo-
lution. These two modified accounts of the TOL are
only partially independent: corroboration of the statisti-
cal TOL will certainly reinforce its use as a heuristic,
and further heuristic application will lead to modifica-
tion of the statistical TOL conceptions. Looking
“beyond the TOL”, we are inclined to believe that the
use of the TOL as a heuristic to organize and analyse
comparative data and partial trees will be with us for
the long haul. Whether there is life remaining in the
TOL beyond this usage or whether it has to be replaced
by new, probably web-like representations of genome
evolution, is a question of major interest for phyloge-




W. Ford Doolittle (Dalhousie University, Halifax,
Canada)
Although there is much about this paper with which I
wholeheartedly agree, and which I think admirably sum-
marizes the state of play, the authors do seem a bit con-
fused about what Eric Bapteste and I called Darwin’s
Tree of Life Hypothesis. In their understanding, we saw
“the TOL as a hypothesis composed of three connected
propositions: natural selection (and potentially other
processes) drives modification, descent occurs with
modification, and hierarchical patterns are produced by
that process.” What we wrote, though was:
“1. The pattern of groups subordinate to groups
embraced by a unique inclusively hierarchical classi-
fication based on homologies (true affinities in Dar-
win’s language) is indeed not arbitrary. It reflects an
underlying natural reality with a natural cause,
rather than ‘’some unknown plan of creation, or the
enunciation of general propositions’’ in Aristotelian
logic, embedded in the practices of systematists.
2. That natural cause is historical, and in particular,
it is direct descent with modification, a branching
process whose branches will be recaptured in the
most truly natural and correct classification, which
might in principle be extended to include the last
common ancestor (or ancestors) of all extant forms.
3. Modification is driven by natural selection.” [70]
I now see this formulation as unduly wordy and prone
to the sort of emphasis-altering paraphrasing O’Malley
and Koonin offer. Bapteste and I could/should have
offered a short form of our own, something like this:
natural classifications are tree-like because the process
that produces the characters on which they are based is
tree-like (and selection is the driving force). The empha-
sis would be on “because”, because Darwin’s was, I
believe, as in these lines from earlier in the same para-
graph that O’Malley and Koonin quote:
“The limbs, divided into great branches, and these
into lesser and lesser branches, were themselves
once, when the tree was young, budding twigs, and
this connection of the former and present buds by
ramifying branches may well represent the classifica-
tion of all extinct and living species in groups subor-
dinate to groups.”
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Jerry Coyne, in his recent Why Evolution is True
[114], similarly sees Darwin endorsing the Tree as an
explanation, or more precisely as a prediction of his the-
ory.
“Actually, the nested arrangement of life was recog-
nized long before Darwin. Starting with the Swedish
botanist Carl Linnaeus in [1735], biologists began
classifying animals and plants, discovering that they
consistently fell into what was called a ‘’natural’’
classification. Strikingly, different biologists came up
with nearly identical groupings. This means that
these groupings are not subjective artifacts of a
human need to classify but tell us something real
and fundamental about nature. But nobody knew
what that something was until Darwin came along
and showed the nested arrangement of life is pre-
cisely what evolution predicts. Creatures with recent
common ancestors share many traits, while those
whose common ancestors lay in the distant past are
more dissimilar. The natural classification is itself
strong evidence of evolution.”
But surely the flaw or “circularity”, the conflation of
explanandum and explanans here should be obvious.
We have a fact (Tree-like classification) and we come
up with a theory (Tree-like evolution) to explain the
fact. Then what do we predict in order to test our the-
ory? Tree-like classification! Panchen’s book, Classifica-
tion, Evolution and the Nature of Biology [115], which
caused me first to twig to the circularity issue, does out-
line some of the ways out of this. And of course Evolu-
tion is True [114], for those reasons and because of the
overwhelming consilience of many lines of evidence.
Authors’ response: Our question here would be
whether Darwin and subsequent evolutionary biologists
are using the logical structure of “X because Y” (explana-
tory, in that Y explains X). We are not convinced this is
the logical structure Darwin was intending and believe it
may better be described as abductive reasoning, which
was outlined by Charles Peirce in 1903 in the form:
“The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence [because of C], there is reason to suspect that
A is true“ [116].
If we substitute C with hierarchical order and A with
TOL, then the abductive structure of TOL reasoning is:
“The surprising fact, of hierarchical order, is
observed;
But if the TOL were true, hierarchical order would
be a matter of course,
Hence [because of hierarchical order], there is reason
to suspect that the TOL is true”.
This structure does not involve the “because” reasoning
of causal explanation. Rather, it is ampliative in that it
adds to what is known and is potentially able to improve
understanding of the phenomena of interest. Abductive
reasoning has been much discussed in philosophy of
science, and has its critics as well as its advocates. More
recently, abductive reasoning has been discussed in the
form of “inference to the best explanation” as philosopher
Peter Lipton [92]points out:
“Inference to the Best Explanation can be seen as an
extension of the idea of ‘self-evidencing’ explanations,
where the phenomenon that is explained in turn pro-
vides an essential part of the reason for believing the
explanation is correct. ... hypotheses are supported by
the very observations they are supposed to explain.
Moreover, on this model, the observations support the
hypothesis precisely because it would explain them.”
In other words, explanation comes prior to inference,
and involves an evaluation of how well different hypoth-
eses would explain existing evidence. The problem then
becomes one of how to evaluate the “best” explanation,
and the logical objection of circularity drops out of the
picture (i.e., it’s not a matter of one “proving” the other).
However, we agree that in the following section, Doolittle
is objecting to the outcome of the inference by arguing
that the TOL is not the best explanation and certainly
not the only explanation available to account for the
“surprising fact” of hierarchical order.
Doolittle responds in a second review: I have only a
folk-philosophical understanding to help me deal with
this, but I swear that this abductive reasoning formula-
tion has a “because” hidden underneath it. Why else
would “hierarchical order” be a “matter of course” if the
“TOL were true"? If by ‘TOL’ the authors mean to refer
to the TOL hypothesis (as articulated above in bold),
then the reason hierarchical order follows as a matter of
course is because and only because a tree-like process is
expected to produce the tree like-pattern of similarities
and differences between organisms that is enshrined in
a hierarchical classification.
Seems pretty because-ish to me: there is a causal con-
nection between evolutionary branching and the disposi-
tion of traits on which hierarchical classification is
based. We would not say, for instance, that “if E = mc2
were true, hierarchical order would be a matter of
course” because even though E does equal mc2 we can
think of no similar causal connection to hierarchy.
Possibly though, O’Malley and Koonin are not refer-
ring to the TOL hypothesis when they say “if the TOL
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were true, hierarchical order would be a matter of
course” but to the TOL itself, that tree-like pattern of
relationships between taxa that molecular phylogeneti-
cists hope to reconstruct (some believing that they
already have). Now that’s circular: it’s like saying “If
there were a natural (aka true) tree-like or hierarchical
pattern of relationships, hierarchical order would be a
matter of course”.
But the authors’ thoughts do persuade me that there
must be degrees of circularity. The goodness of fit
between hierarchical classification and the TOL hypoth-
esis does seem like some sort of support, or consistency
with, or even evidence for it (in the sense that hierarchi-
cal classification is none of these for E = mc2). But
surely it is not “proof”. Surely it a standard part of
scientific practice to expect that a hypothesis should
make predictions about data not yet obtained, and of a
different sort than the data which suggested the theory.
Francisco Ayala, one of Darwinism’s most stalwart sup-
porters, accepts this too, writing that,
“If a hypothesis is formulated to account for some
known phenomena, these phenomena may provide
credibility to the hypothesis, but by themselves do
not amount to a genuine empirical test of it for the
purpose of validating it” [117].
I am also persuaded that “Inference to Best Explana-
tion” is a valid way to do science, but also encouraged
by what I take is the authors’ admission that the exis-
tence of other defensible explanations for the same “sur-
prising fact” strengthens our (mine and Eric Bapteste’s)
claim that whatever Darwin meant by the Tree “simile”,
it could/should now be taken as an hypothesis. But
surely they would not have us believe that when only
one explanation is apparent to the scientific community,
it must be taken as fact.
Which gets us back to the “surprising fact of hierarch-
ical order.” Why “surprising"? Who was surprised (in
1859)? What is the null hypothesis here? Why should
we expect disorder rather than order? Darwin’s goal was
to come up with a naturalistic explanation for an orderly
pattern of relationships in nature to replace the superna-
turalistic one then (and sadly still) hegemonic. ("Let the
earth bring forth grass, plants yielding seed of each
kind, and trees bearing fruit of each kind ...”). That
there is such an orderly pattern doesn’t discriminate
between these views, for all we scientists embrace the
former.
Doolittle’s first response continued: But natural
classification is not proof of evolution or of the exis-
tence of an underlying tree-like process. Not only is the
logic shaky, there is an alternative. It is in principle pos-
sible, as Peter Gogarten and colleagues will argue
elsewhere in this issue [118], that biased LGT can pro-
duce tree-like patterns from a process that is not itself
tree-like. Maybe taxon A and taxon B appear to be sis-
ters to the exclusion of C because they share genes
more frequently, not an ancestor more recent. This too
would be “descent with modification”. So it is instead
specifically (1) that descent with modification is a predo-
minantly tree-like process and (2) that this tree-like pro-
cess produces a tree-like pattern, that together make up
Darwin’s hypothesis. “Descent with modification” is
often taken to mean tree-like evolution, but it needn’t,
and we probably should not even have used the term in
the long-form of the Tree of Life Hypothesis. The word
“genealogical” is equally squirrely. When we use it in a
human context, unique family trees (usually only patri-
monial ones) come instantly to mind, but in fact we are
each at the end of 2N genealogies, going back N
generations.
I think that when cladists say that trees branches are
hypotheses they mean that they are hypotheses about
relationships between specific taxa, not a general expla-
nation for why there should be trees at all. So Darwin’s
Tree of Life Hypothesis, as Bapteste and I understand it,
is not gently morphable into some looser Statistical Tree
of Life (STOL) Hypothesis, as O’Malley and Koonin
seem to suggest. An STOL could also arise from ram-
pant gene transfer – with no deep vertical signal – pro-
vided there is some bias affecting LGT. And who could
sensibly imagine that there would not be many biases?
But such an STOL would be precisely not what Darwin’s
Tree of Life Hypothesis was about. So O’Malley and
Koonin are partly right when they claim that Bapteste
and I would “claim that accommodation and expansion
are not legitimate ways in which to treat hypotheses.”
They would be fully right had they added “especially
when the expanded hypothesis has transmogrified into
something antithetical to its original form.”
Authors’ response: We tend to agree regarding the
drastic and irreversible transformation of Darwin’s TOL
hypothesis and had already noted in the text the specific
nature of cladist hypotheses. Darwin simply was not
equipped to think of anything other than an organismal/
species tree. He could not think of trees for individual
genes because he was unaware of the existence of the lat-
ter. We note that Doolittle agrees with us regarding what
we said about accommodation being rejected by Doolittle
and Bapteste, but think the even stronger clause tacked
on in this response would be hard to defend. It is not
clear that the extended TOL hypothesis should be con-
sidered “antithetical” to Darwin’s ideas even though it is
indeed dramatically different. From today’s perspective,
Darwin’s hypothesis is not properly defined as such a
definition was outside the purview of the science of Dar-
win’s day. With this realization, the purported circularity
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of the argument becomes less evident and less damning
(even if abductive reasoning is not taken into account) –
we think it actually goes away. The fundamental tree-
like character of evolution is not derived from an
observed tree-like pattern of classification. On the con-
trary, this is an intrinsic feature of the evolutionary pro-
cess that follows a fundamental observation of biology,
namely the bifurcating character of gene replication [69]
and cell division. Under this view, the STOL can be con-
ceived as a straightforwardly testable hypothesis. If any-
one manages to show that there is no statistically
significant trend of topologically congruent trees, the
STOL will be found wanting in terms of predictive power
and effectively refuted. So far it seems to have withstood
the test. We agree that the biased HGT hypothesis of
Gogarten, Doolittle and Lawrence is a viable alternative
although there seems to be considerable uncertainty as
to whether biased HGT could be the sole explanation for
the observed tree-like patterns for gene ensembles, or just
a complementary explanation to a genuine trend of ver-
tical evolution [32,119]. Testing this hypothesis poses
conceptual and technical challenges but some
approaches have been attempted, and the results seemed
to contradict the most radical version of the biased HGT
hypothesis [58]. However, most of the work in this direc-
tion remains to be done. This is the main point we
would like to make in this discussion: the STOL might
turn out to be false but it is a bona fide hypothesis.
Doolittle responds in a second review: Well, OK,
maybe “antithetical” is too strong, and of course it’s a
mug’s game guessing what Darwin would think were he
still here. And I will agree that the STOL hypothesis as
stated above (that there are more congruent trees than
expected by chance), though possibly unprovable at
depth, is not only coherent but unavoidably true. But if
– as is possible – the majority of the genes that make
up any prokaryote’s genome, determine its phenome
and define its “relationships” to other prokaryotes actu-
ally arrived in that genome by lateral transfer rather
than vertical descent, then I’d put money on the vener-
able bicentenarian saying “Oh, that’s not what I had in
mind at all!”
Doolittle’s first response continued: It’s not easy to
argue against the value of the TOL as an heuristic or
tool, but I’ll try. If what undergirds such a TOL (which
would be in actuality an STOL) are central tendencies,
then we must always be careful to hedge statements we
make about it. If we say something like “halophilic
archaea arose from within the methanogens with the
importation of bacterial genes for respiration” we need
to be very careful to note that methanogens that far
back in time need not have had any specific genes or
capacities other than a taxon-defining 16S rRNA. To
draw what I think is an apt analogy, we need to be
similarly careful when we say something like “early Eng-
lish arose from several ancient Germanic languages” not
to pretend that we would recognize it or any of those
others if someone started speaking them to us on the
street. The literature of language evolution is amazingly
parallel to our own on these questions, but ahead of us
in sophistication and realism, I think. For instance, Heg-
garty et al. in a 2011 paper on Germanic languages
[120] say this about the evolution of English:
“If our real goal is to uncover the histories of the
populations that spoke given languages, rather than
abstract schemas intellectually satisfying for their
binary purity, then it is served by using language
data to arrive at a picture of the nature and degree
of cohesion (or otherwise) of speech communities
within a language family, through the story of its
divergence. To this end, we must represent the his-
torical and linguistic truth that English ultimately
underwent a longer and more total isolation than
did most continental varieties from each other. The
approach that best uncovers this signal is to measure
and represent the full impact of all those far-reach-
ing changes that came to mark it out as so distinct
from all other Germanic varieties in so many ways ...
Furthermore, while English is widely assumed to
have derived from a mixture of Germanic dialects–
eminently logical also in terms of population his-
tory–this too cannot be represented in a tree model.
That structure is inherently forced to oversimplify
the most plausible history. Nor could it capture the
clear possibility that of the dialectal mix that went to
make up English, a greater part was of more western
than northern Germanic character and provenience,
but not exclusively so, especially at a time when the
difference between those two groups may well have
been very much a continuum still. It is such matters
of degree, rather than mutually exclusive binary
alternatives, that speak in favour of distance and net-
work analyses for language history, and against tree-
only ones.”
We microbiologists must accept that this sort of
messy historicity will also be appropriate for any true
description of microbial evolution, however tightly we
hug our statistical trees.
Authors’ response: We too accept the inescapable
messy historicity of any adequate description of evolu-
tion, especially (but by no means exclusively) when it
concerns microbes. We are perhaps slightly at odds
about whether statistical analyses can capture in a help-
ful way the fuzziness of evolutionary processes. Our rea-
soning is this: given such messiness, if we want to
discover any patterns in this history, an organizing
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framework is badly needed, and the (S)TOL is one of the
best frameworks for such a purpose. The STOL can be
used as a framework for the construction of evolutionary
scenarios, which is what much of evolutionary biology is
about. The ultimate value of this framework is contin-
gent on the robustness of the STOL hypothesis (see
above). If the hypothesis stands up to rigorous examina-
tion and testing, the STOL can be reasonably considered
a uniquely powerful heuristic. Should the hypothesis fail
to stand up against such scrutiny, a tree for a universal
gene like 16S RNA still can be used as a standard of
comparison, without bestowing on it any special ontologi-
cal status. Certainly, our advocacy of the STOL as a fra-
mework for evolutionary studies should not be taken as
an attempt to invalidate promising complementary fra-
meworks such as various kinds of evolutionary networks
[121,122].
Doolittle responds in a second review: It would be
silly to claim that trees are not useful in the construc-
tion of evolutionary scenarios. But to the extent that any
STOL is not the history of the lineages of organisms or
genomes such studies address, but rather a summation
of biases in LGT, we can be misled.
Reviewer 2
Nicolas Galtier (CNRS, Montpellier, France)
I much enjoyed reading this piece, which I think is a
sound, balanced, well-written overview + opinion about
an important topic – Tree of Life (TOL) significance.
The manuscript correctly makes clear that
(i) genomic evolution is far from 100% tree-like,
(ii) drawing a tree does not mean assuming that geno-
mic evolution is 100% tree-like,
and reviews the way these two basic-looking state-
ments have been acknowledged, and their relative
importance weighted, by the scientific community. I feel
I agree with most of the arguments made in the paper,
some of which I tried to express in a previous Biology
Direct review [103]. I share the prediction that TOL will
remain useful to evolutionary sciences in the forthcom-
ing years, or decades. Here are a couple of thoughts that
arose while reading this article, which I take the liberty
to express although not all of them are tightly con-
nected to the specific content of the manuscript.
The text says: “understanding of evolutionary history
arguably should be the goal of all research in evolution-
ary biology”. I would modulate. I think a large part of
research in evolutionary biology is about the process,
not the pattern. Besides history, we also would like to
understand the evolutionary forces having shaped cur-
rent biodiversity, including mutation, selection, drift,
recombination, duplication, HGT, speciation, extinction,
vertical inheritance. I note that the last five of these pro-
cesses (i) implicitly acknowledge the relevance of the
tree of cells, (ii) would be optimally studied if the tree
of cells was known, and (iii) have been typically
approached by taking the “average"/"central” tree as an
estimate of the tree of cells - sometimes in a disguised
way, by calling it “taxonomy”.
Authors response: We fully agree and have modified
the text in question to state:
“Treating all these non-tree-like processes as pro-
blems that obscure the “true” TOL greatly skews and
limits the understanding of evolutionary history that
is one of the central goals of evolutionary biology –
along with understanding processes and patterns of
evolution [123].“
I would like to suggest that “falsifying” the TOL in the
face of HGT would be equivalent to, e.g., falsifying the
Linnean taxonomy in the face of gene flow, genetic
incompatibilities, and hybridization. We know that the
living world is not made of reproductively isolated
groups of fully interbreeding individuals. Yet the species
concept captures a lot of the information about geneti-
cal exchanges between living things (at least in animals
and plants). We can debate the concept, refine it, call it
insufficient, but we just cannot dismiss it.
Authors’ response: Agreed. The use of the term “falsi-
fication”, with its connotations of an exact hypothesis
that can be decisively falsified by a single or even a few
negative findings is problematic. We had noted that in
the text, but had used the word casually in a few places
ourselves. We have replaced these uses of falsification
with broader terminology except where we cite others
who use this exact term. And we think our discussion of
heuristics harmonizes with the reviewer’s thoughts on
usefulness and information capture.
I wonder why the discovery of HGT in prokaryotes
led to such extreme proposals as “Darwin was wrong”
and “the TOL is dead”, whereas the discovery of gene
and genome duplication, gene loss, transposition, and
incomplete lineage sorting, and other efficient anti-
TOL processes, did not. If you think about it, the
widely accepted vertebrate tree is a “tree of a few per-
cent”. The proportion of nucleotides in the human
genome for which the personal history during the last
500 million years matches the canonical vertebrate tree
is minute. Nobody complains when, in vertebrates,
people discard paralogues (which they circularly iden-
tify thanks to prior speculations about the species
tree), repeated elements and genes of viral origin, then
build trees. In this taxon, it is undisputed that the spe-
cies tree is a meaningful representation of evolution,
however incomplete it may be, and however prevalent
and interesting the anti-TOL processes may be (and
they really are).
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So why this difference? I think one reason is that in
vertebrates we have a mental representation of evolving
units (species) independently of their genomes. The spe-
cies tree makes sense when you are interested in species.
We would much like to learn about our vertebrate
ancestors, irrespective of the fraction of genes we have
vertically inherited from them. Vertebrate species are so
neatly defined that we are happy to ignore the genealo-
gical mosaicism of their genome, at best considered as a
curiosity. Bacterial species, in contrast, are merely seen
as identical bags of non-identical genes. Consequently,
what matters in the first place (to us) in bacteria is the
forest of gene trees, not the tree of bags. This might
indeed reflect a genuine biological difference between
the two groups (e.g., a more complex genotype-pheno-
type link in vertebrate than in bacteria), such that the
TOL would actually have less scientific value in bacteria
than in vertebrates. Alternatively, the difference of treat-
ment might reflect our much deeper knowledge of (or
interest in, or ability to perceive) the vertebrate than the
bacterial biology and diversity.
Authors’ response: We find this to be a deep com-
ment a full discussion of which would require another
manuscript perhaps the same size as this review article.
We can offer only a few brief thoughts here. It is true
that the gulf between the current perceptions of the sta-
tus and importance of trees for vertebrates (and even
animals in general), on one hand, and for bacteria and
archaea, on the other hand, is huge. We can think of at
least four reasons (certainly, not mutually exclusive) why
this is the case. 1. To be fair, the vertebrate tree only
becomes a “tree of a few percent” if the entire genome is
considered. Looking at protein-coding genes only (indeed,
less than 1.5% of mammalian DNA), the pan-vertebrate
gene set is respectable (thousands of genes), and if in-
paralogues are carefully taken into account, something
like a “tree of half the genes” is possible, with topologies
for individual genes being highly congruent. All the
importance of the non-tree-like evolutionary processes
notwithstanding, this is a far cry from the “tree of one
percent” that is feasible for prokaryotes. 2. The vertebrate
tree is, in a sense, “tangible”, with internal nodes often
associated with specific forms about which much is
known from the fossil record. There is no fossil support
for the tree of prokaryotes, and no chance ever to obtain
such support, which certainly makes this tree less “real”
than the tree of vertebrates. 3. For vertebrates, the con-
cept of species is clearly defined and biologically mean-
ingful despite some limitations. For prokaryotes, the
species concept is fuzzy at best and meaningless at worst,
its applicability appears to vary for different groups of
bacteria and archaea, and there is no chance of a uni-
versal, biologically sound definition of species [124].
Thus, if one chooses to speak of a “species tree”, it is
clear what is meant in the case of vertebrates but not in
the case of prokaryotes. 4. The difference in the percep-
tion of trees is psychological and indeed reflects common
and serious under-appreciation of the non-tree like
aspects of evolution that are present and important in
all life forms.
This leads me to my very last comment. The text says:
“This pluralistic perspective also suggests an addi-
tional issue of whether to separate representations
and theories of eukaryote and prokaryote evolution,
due to the different tempos, modes and outcomes of
evolution involved. More than one account of evolu-
tionary processes and mechanisms may be necessary
to encompass the varieties of evolving life on the
Earth.”
I fully agree with the second sentence especially. HGT
is one out of several anti-TOL evolutionary processes,
and eukaryotes, by the way, are champions of HGT
(partly, but not uniquely, through endosymbiosis) and of
genome mosaicism. I am confident we would not ques-
tion the relevance of the vertebrate tree even if we dis-
covered substantial HGT in this group. I suggest that
the distinct values we assign to the species tree in dis-
tinct taxa is determined by our representation of what
species are, not by the way species evolve. If the genome
of an insect and a Wolbachia strain once became physi-
cally merged and fully co-transmitted, we would com-
fortably call the resulting organism an insect. If such a
fusion occurred between a bacterium and an archaeon,
we would probably call the resulting organism a new
domain of life. Non-tree-like evolution is everywhere.
Scientists decide how meaningful it is.
Authors’ response: Another truly interesting point. It
is difficult to argue with the example given by the
reviewer. Certainly, in these two cases, the interpretations
of genome fusion would be quite different. Are the deci-
sion criteria “purely” subjective? Perhaps, they do not
have to be. One criterion that immediately comes to
mind is quantitative: if one of the merging genomes (the
one designated as donor) makes a contribution that is
orders of magnitude less than the contribution of the
other partner (recipient), we will confidently identify the
recipient as the main organism in the resulting chimera.
In contrast, if the contributions of the partners are com-
parable, we will speak of a new domain or some such.
This approach certainly works in the cases of Wolba-
chia-insect and bacterium-archaeon. However, it is easy
to come up with counterexamples: about half of mam-
malian genomes consist of remnants of retrotranscribing
elements but we have no problem at all classifying these
organisms as vertebrates. Similarly, certain mesophilic
archaea such as Methanosarcina acquired more than
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20% of their genes from bacteria but all microbiologists
agree that they remain archaea. Thus, the quantitative
criterion is not entirely satisfactory, and a qualitative
one may prove more appropriate. When genome fusion
leaves the cell organization of the host (more or less)
intact, we are comfortable to interpret the situation as
“horizontal gene transfer as usual” – these are the cases
of Wolbachia and insect, Methanosarcina, and retroele-
ments in vertebrates. By contrast, when genome fusion is
accompanied by (or perhaps causes) a drastic change in
cell biology, we are inclined to speak of the emergence of
new domains or at least of major new groups of organ-
isms. These are the cases of endosymbiosis in eukaryotes
that lead to the emergence of new organelles, such as
mitochondria and plastids. This qualitative criterion
seems to make biological sense and applies also to the
interpretation of trees. When a tree for a set of “core”
genes reflects the continuity of cellular (organismal) biol-
ogy, that tree remains relevant, even as one has to realize
that it describes the evolution of a small fraction of the
genetic material in the respective organisms. In contrast,
when the biological continuity breaks down, so does the
tree. In some senses, this distinction implies that ontolo-
gical priority is given to cellular organization over genetic
structure, and that morphological considerations trump
molecular ones. There are potentially good epistemologi-
cal reasons for accepting such hierarchies, but as pointed
out by Galtier, it is of deep interest to reflect on how his-
torical and psychological factors may have a role to play
in preferences for certain explanations.
Reviewer 3
Christophe Malaterre (Institut d’Histoire et de Philoso-
phie des Sciences et Techniques, CNRS, France)
In this paper, O’Malley and Koonin very convincingly
argue that the notion of “Tree of Life” (TOL) covers
two distinct concepts: (A) a hypothesis about the repre-
sentation of the evolution and relatedness of organisms
on Earth, (B) a heuristic tool that is useful to classify
these organisms and that leads to new knowledge in
evolutionary biology. In the first section of the paper,
the authors review and clarify two main ways of under-
standing what the TOL is: the TOL notion may cover
trees built from molecular phylogenetic studies of single
genes, in particular the 16S and 18S rRNA genes; it may
cover also trees built from the congruent phylogenetic
signals of several genes, be they part of a “core genome”
or chosen for the “central trend” that they exhibit. The
authors then briefly compare these TOL tree-meanings
to the “web of genomes” (or network) approach. In the
second major section, they develop their main thesis on
the two different concepts covered by the notion of
TOL. First, the TOL can be understood as a scientific
hypothesis. In this case, under a strict interpretation,
this hypothesis has been refuted; yet under a modified
interpretation that accommodates new findings into a
“statistical TOL”, this hypothesis still awaits refutation
and is even useful. Second, the authors argue that the
TOL can be understood as a heuristic tool, that is to say
a concept that is not to be evaluated as true/false with
respect to its correspondence to nature, but that is use-
ful to the practice of science in at least two ways: as a
conventional framework for classifying organisms or
species, and as a means to “open up valuable lines of
inquiry”. In this case too, the TOL notion proves useful.
In a short third section, the authors develop the idea
that “the universal tree is not and has never been purely
about right and wrong facts, but about the pragmatic
knowledge-producing capacity of the TOL framework”.
I find the conceptual clarifications of the TOL pro-
posed by the authors extremely useful and enlightening.
It is indeed crucial to realize that the TOL can cover at
least two radically distinct concepts – scientific hypoth-
esis and heuristic tool – and that it may therefore be
evaluated in at least two different ways: with respect to
its refutability or with respect to its usefulness. As such
the paper is an extremely valuable conceptual contribu-
tion to the more general TOL debate.
Let me mention however two points that raise ques-
tions. The first one has to do with the notion of
“hypothesis”. Some may indeed argue that the TOL is
not just any type of “hypothesis”, but a hypothesis that
tells us something about the real evolutionary related-
ness among groups of organisms. In other words, it
might be argued that the TOL is above all a scientific
theory. Of course, following Poincaré [125], one may say
that all generalizations and theories are hypotheses; yet
they are particular types of hypotheses: hypotheses that
are refutable while also well corroborated by observa-
tions [126], that include bridge principles that mediate
their correspondence to observation data [127], that
take the form of research programs constituted by a
central core of propositions surrounded by a belt of pro-
tective assumptions [87], or even hypotheses that are
constituted by classes of models isomorphic to certain
domains of nature [128]. It seems to me that taking a
“theory” perspective on the TOL – a perspective that is
often implicit in the paper since it is indeed made refer-
ence to Popper and Lakatos among others – could help
the argument proposed by the authors in at least two
respects. First, some philosophical models of scientific
theories make it possible to account for theory modifica-
tion or replacement over time; such a view could
thereby help explain why the TOL is still around despite
claims of its “refutation”. Second, philosophical models
of scientific theories also make it possible to discuss
how theories relate to the real world (for instance via
bridge principles); and a discussion of how the TOL as
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a hypothesis/theory does indeed relate to nature could
indeed extend the argument of the paper, even if the
authors purposefully restrain their arguments to non-
ontological matters.
Authors’ response: These are very useful thoughts on
what it is that is being disputed in regard to the TOL.
We have discussed above with our first reviewer (WFD)
whether the TOL took the logical form in Darwin’s
thinking that Doolittle and Bapteste suggest it did. In
this article, we mentioned the multi-propositional nature
of Darwin’s ideas about the TOL. These connected pro-
positions, both core and contextual, might be most accu-
rately described as a theory, as Malaterre suggests, and
we could then engage in extended philosophical discus-
sions of the correspondence of the TOL theory to aspects
of the world. The TOL debates are both about the real-
ness of the TOL and about its epistemological value,
and in this article we argue that the two facets of the
debate can be cleanly and profitably separated. Theories
are something philosophy of science has focused on for
decades. This attention has been illuminating but it has
also obscured many other aspects of scientific practice.
One of these has been how theories or core elements of
theories are operationalized in workaday hypotheses
such as claims about the TOL. This sort of activity is at
least part of what we address in this article. Indeed, it
would be useful to analyse the TOL as a theory, and to
see how different philosophical accounts of theory inter-
pret TOL claims and contestations, but pragmatic con-
cerns guide our choices here. The extended discussion
that Malaterre advocates, in which the TOL is examined
as a theory, would no doubt be illuminating for TOL
researchers.
A second point concerns the fact that, as shown by
the careful and well-crafted section on “reinterpreting
the TOL”, the notion of TOL may be explicated in
many different ways. As a result, some may argue that
their ways of defining a TOL differ from those that are
offered in the paper and that, as the result, they may
not map onto the two roles identified by the authors
(hypothesis or heuristic tool). It seems to me that a spe-
cific risk stems from a possible conflation of the episte-
mology of the TOL and its ontology. This point is
clearly identified by the authors, yet only in the second
section of the paper, and I wish this distinction were
made earlier. Indeed, when presenting the different con-
struals of the TOL in the first main section, the authors
mention “trees of genes as trees of species” and “trees of
genomes as trees of cells”. Yet these expressions tend to
conflate different possible meanings associated with the
TOL: Is the TOL a tree of genes or a tree of species?
What does the “as” imply? Is it rather a tree of genomes
or a tree of cells? If it is a tree of cells, how does it differ
from a tree of species?
Authors’ response: This comment points to a dimen-
sion of discussion we largely sidestepped and yet which is
of enormous importance to TOL debates. We now men-
tion earlier in the manuscript how we think ontological
issues have been conflated with epistemological ones, and
we also announce there that we try to separate the two
as best we can. The questions Malaterre asks in this part
of the review lie at the heart of ontological clarification
of the TOL, and as far as we are concerned, they are
unresolved. What we are doing with the “as”, therefore, is
signalling that we are agnostic on the exact nature of the
relationships between the two interpretations of the TOL.
We think it unlikely that there is an identity relationship
(in which “as” would mean “the same as”). We note that
methods are being used that presume some sort of
equivalence, and we then focus on those methodological
choices. Laura Franklin-Hall [67]has done some philoso-
phical work on the implications of such relationships,
but there is still more that could be done, as Malaterre
points out. This is especially because in practice, TOL
ontology and epistemology are not isolated from one
another. And yes, it is likely that our two foci, hypothesis
and heuristic, do not exhaust what can be done with the
TOL. Indeed, Malaterre rightly emphasizes the fruitful-
ness of thinking about the TOL as theory, and the same
could no doubt be said for the TOL as a model.
Maybe distinctions could be made between different
types of TOL depending on the types of entities that
they refer to. One might, for instance, distinguish three
types of entities: (i) real source entities such as genes,
core genomes, gene sets that are extracted from particu-
lar present-day organisms and whose data are used to
generate a tree-like or network-like representational
model; (ii) represented entities that would include the
source entities (as end-points in the model) but also
such entities as ancestral genes or gene sets (as addi-
tional nodes in the model); and (iii) interpreted entities
such as organisms, species, past or present, once an
interpretation of the model is given. Accordingly, the
TOL might be understood as a represented entities TOL
(a tree-like model that is built from the source entities
using various computational tools, some of which might
in addition include hierarchical branching assumptions),
or as an interpreted entities TOL (an interpretation of
the previous tree-like model in terms of organisms or
species for instance). Furthermore, one may consider
the existence of the real genealogy of the real organisms
on Earth, and therefore postulate the existence of real
entities phylogenies at different levels (genes, genomes,
cells, organisms, species). It then seems that some of the
controversies mentioned in the paper – in particular
when it comes to the falsifiability of the “TOL as
hypothesis” – could be understood as disagreements
about how to answer three different questions: (1)
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Given a set of real source entities, is the inferred repre-
sented entities TOL true – in the sense that if the corre-
sponding real entities phylogeny were known, the two
would match – or is it false due, for instance, to lack of
data or to wrong inferences made by our computational
tools? (2) Given a represented entities TOL (for instance
a gene tree), is the interpreted entities TOL (for instance
a species tree) true – in the sense that if the corre-
sponding real entities phylogeny were known, the two
would match – or is it false due to a wrong interpreta-
tion? And (3), are the real entities phylogenies tree-like
or not? And, while the third question is a question that
concerns the structure or topology of phylogenies, the
two first questions concern the more general problem of
inference justification. These three types of questions
might also help clarify the different epistemological
levels at which the TOL might play a role as a hypoth-
esis/theory, and more specific circumstances in which it
might endorse a more heuristic role.
Authors’ response: This is an interesting and poten-
tially useful tripartite scheme for further analysis of
debates about the TOL, and we believe such a frame-
work of inquiry has never been suggested before. While it
is not practical to rewrite the present article with this
structure in mind, we would heartily endorse any
attempt (from philosophical or life-science standpoints)
to analyse TOL claims and research in light of this intri-
guing framework.
In any case, the conceptual distinctions that O’Malley
and Koonin propose are most relevant to the debate:
distinguishing between the TOL as a hypothesis (or a
theory) and the TOL as a heuristic will help make dis-
cussions on the topic more precise and will improve the
conceptual framing of some well-entrenched
controversies.
Authors’ response: We are most grateful to all three
reviewers for the exceedingly thoughtful analyses they
made of our paper, and the new routes of inquiry they
have shared with us.
Acknowledgements and Funding
EVK is supported by intramural funds of the Department of Health and
Human Services (National Library of Medicine).
MAO acknowledges the Leverhulme Trust for support of the network,
Questioning the Tree of Life. Early research for this paper was done with
funding from the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. The writing
was carried out with Australian Research Council Future Fellowship funding,
at the University of Sydney, Australia.
Author details
1Department of Philosophy, Quadrangle A14, University of Sydney, NSW
2006, Australia. 2National Center for Biotechnology Information, National
Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda MD20894, USA.
Authors’ contributions
Both authors contributed equally to the planning and writing of this Review.
Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 14 March 2011 Accepted: 30 June 2011
Published: 30 June 2011
References
1. Doolittle WF: (2005) If the Tree of Life fell, would we recognize the
sound? In Microbial Phylogeny and Evolution. Edited by: Sapp J. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2005:199-133.
2. Sapp J: The New Foundations of Evolution On the Tree of Life Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 2009.
3. O’Malley MA, Boucher Y: Paradigm change in evolutionary microbiology.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci 2005, 36:183-208.
4. Darwin C: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life. 1 edition. London:
John Murray; 1859.
5. Haeckel E: Generelle Morphologie der Organismen Berlin: Reimer; 1866.
6. Dayrat B: The roots of phylogeny: How did Haeckel build his trees? Syst
Biol 2003, 52:515-527.
7. Hacking I: Root and branch. The Nation 2007 [http://www.thenation.com/
doc/20071008/hacking].
8. Willmann R: From Haeckel to Hennig: The early development of
phylogenetics in German-speaking Europe. Cladistics 2003, 19:449-479.
9. Stevens PF: Metaphors and typology in the development of botanical
systematics 1690-1960, or the art of putting new wine in old bottles.
Taxon 1984, 33:169-211.
10. de Queiroz K: Systematics and the Darwinian revolution. Philos Sci 1988,
55:238-259.
11. Mayr E: Systematics and the Origin of Species: From the Viewpoint of a
Zoologist NY: Columbia University Press; 1942.
12. Allan HH: Natural hybridization in relation to taxonomy. In The New
Systematics. Edited by: Huxley J. Oxford: Clarendon; 1940:515-528.
13. Woese CR, Fox GE: Phylogenetic structure of the prokaryotic domain: The
primary kingdoms. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 1977, 74:5088-5090.
14. Schwartz RM, Dayhoff MO: Origins of prokaryotes, eukaryotes,
mitochondria, and chloroplasts: A perspective is derived from protein
and nucleic acid sequence data. Science 1978, 199:395-403.
15. Woese CR: Bacterial evolution. Microbiol Rev 1987, 51:221-271.
16. Sidow A, Wilson AC: Compositional statistics: An improvement of
evolutionary parsiomony and its application to deep branches in the
tree of life. J Mol Evol 1990, 31:51-68.
17. Linkkila TP, Gogarten JP: Tracing origins with molecular sequences:
Rooting the tree of life. Trends Biochem Sci 1991, 16:287-288.
18. Koonin EV: Darwinian evolution in light of genomics. Nucleic Acids Res
2009, 37:1011-1034.
19. Welch RA, Burland V, Plunkett G, Redford P, Roesch P, Rasko D, Buckles EL,
Liou SR, Boutin A, Hackett J, Stroud D, Mayhew GF, Rose DJ, Zhou S,
Schwartz DC, Perna NT, Mobley HL, Blattner FR: Extensive mosaic structure
revealed by the complete genome sequence of uropathogenic
Escherichia coli. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2002, 99:17020-17024.
20. Medini D, Donati Tettelin H, Masignani V, Rappuoli R: The microbial pan-
genome. Curr Opin Genet Dev 2005, 1:589-594.
21. Tettelin H, Riley D, Cattuto C, Medini D: Comparative genomics: The
bacterial pan-genome. Curr Opin Microbiol 2008, 12:472-477.
22. Lapierre P, Gogarten JP: Estimating the size of the bacteria pan-genome.
Trends Genet 2008, 25:107-110.
23. Andersson JO: Lateral gene transfer in eukaryotes. Cell Mol Life Sci 2005,
62:1182-1197.
24. Hotopp JC, Clark ME, Oliveira DC, Foster JM, Fischer P, Torres MC, Giebel JD,
Kumar N, Ishmael N, Wang S, Ingram J, Nene RV, Shepard J, Tomkins J,
Richards S, Spiro DJ, Ghedin E, Slatko BE, Tettelin H, Werren JH: Widespread
lateral gene transfer from intracellular bacteria to multicellular
eukaryotes. Science 2007, 317:1753-1756.
25. Keeling PJ, Palmer JD: Horizontal gene transfer in eukaryotic evolution.
Nat Rev Genet 2008, 9:605-618.
26. Richards TA, Soanes DM, Foster PG, Leonard G, Thornton CR, Talbot NJ:
Phylogenomic analysis demonstrates a pattern of rare and ancient
horizontal gene transfer between plants and fungi. Plant Cell 2009,
21:1897-1911.
O’Malley and Koonin Biology Direct 2011, 6:32
http://www.biology-direct.com/content/6/1/32
Page 19 of 21
27. Bapteste E, O’Malley MA, Beiko RM, Ereshefsky M, Gogarten JP, Franklin-
Hall L, Lapointe FJ, Dupré J, Dagan T, Boucher Y, Martin W: Prokaryote
evolution and the tree of life are two different things. Biol Direct 2009,
4:34.
28. Baldauf SL, Palmer JD, Doolittle WF: The root of the universal tree and the
origin of eukaryotes based on elongation factor phylogeny. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 1996, 93:7749-7754.
29. Philippe H, Forterre P: The rooting of the universal tree of life is not
reliable. J Mol Evol 1999, 49:509-523.
30. Pace NR: Mapping the tree of life: progress and prospects. Microbiol Mol
Biol Rev 2009, 73:565-576.
31. Jaspers E, Overmann J: Ecological significance of microdiversity: Identical
16S rRNA gene sequences can be found in bacteria with highly
divergent genomes and ecophysiologies. Appl Environ Microbiol 2004,
70:4831-4839.
32. Gogarten JP, Doolittle WF, Lawrence JG: Prokaryotic evolution in light of
gene transfer. Mol Biol Evol 2002, 19:2226-2238.
33. Fournier GP, Gogarten JP: Rooting the ribosomal tree of life. Mol Biol Evol
2010, 27:1792-1801.
34. Fournier GP, Huang J, Gogarten JP: Horizontal gene transfer from extinct
and extant lineages: Biological innovation and the tree of life. Philos
Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2229-2239.
35. Foster PG, Cox CJ, Embley TM: The primary divisions of life: A
phylogenomic approach employing composition-heterogeneous
methods. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2197-2207.
36. Dagan T, Martin W: The tree of one percent. Genome Biol 2006, 7:118.
37. Lake JA, Skophammer RG, Herbold CW, Servin JA: Genome beginnings:
Rooting the tree of life. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2177-2185.
38. Ragan MA, McInerney JO, Lake JA: The network of life: Genome
beginnings and evolution. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2169-2175.
39. Page RDM, Charleston MA: From gene to organismal phylogeny:
Reconciled trees and the gene tree/species tree problem. Mol Phylogenet
Evol 1997, 7:231-240.
40. Rasmussen MD, Kellis M: A Bayesian approach for fast and accurate gene
tree reconstruction. Mol Biol Evol 2011, 28:273-290.
41. Maddison WP: Gene trees in species trees. Syst Biol 1997, 46:523-536.
42. Doyle JJ: Gene trees and species trees: Molecular systematic as one-
character taxonomy. Syst Bot 1992, 17:144-163.
43. Knowles LL: Estimating species trees: Methods of phylogenetic analysis
when there is incongruence across genes. Syst Biol 2009, 58(5):463-467.
44. Delsuc F, Brinkmann H, Phillippe H: Phylogenomics and the
reconstruction of the tree of life. Nat Rev Genet 2005, 6:361-375.
45. House CH: The tree of life viewed through the contents of genomes. In
Horizontal Gene Transfer Genomes in Flux. Edited by: Gogarten MB, Gogarten
JP, Olendzenski LC. NY: Humana; 2009:141-161.
46. Snel B, Huynen MA, Dutilh BE: Genome trees and the nature of genome
evolution. Annu Rev Microbiol 2005, 59:191-209.
47. Lerat E, Daubin V, Moran NA: From gene trees to organismal phylogeny
in prokaryotes: The case of the γ-proteobacteria. PLoS Biol 2003,
1:101-109.
48. Daubin V, Moran NA, Ochman H: Phylogenetics and the cohesion of
bacterial genomes. Science 2003, 301:829-832.
49. Daubin V, Gouy M, Perrière G: A phlogenomic approach to bacterial
phylogeny: Evidence of a core of genes sharing a common history.
Genome Res 2002, 12:1080-1090.
50. Rokas A, Williams BL, King N, Carroll SB: Genome-scale approaches to
resolving incongruence in molecular phylogenies. Nature 2003,
425:798-804.
51. Gribaldo S, Brochier C: Phylogeny of prokaryotes: Does it exist and why
should we care? Res Microbiol 2009, 160:513-521.
52. Dutilh BE, Snel B, Ettema TJG, Huynen MA: Signature genes as a
phylogenomic tool. Mol Biol Evol 2008, 25:1659-1667.
53. Bapteste E, Susko E, Leigh J, Ruiz-Trillo I, Bucknam J, Doolittle WF:
Alternative methods for concatenation of core genes indicate a lack of
resolution in deep nodes of the prokaryotic phylogeny. Mol Biol Evol
2007, 25:83-91.
54. Ciccarelli FD, Doerks T, von Mering C, Creevey CJ, Snel B, Bork P: Toward
automatic reconstruction of a highly resolved tree of life. Science 2006,
311:1283-1287.
55. McInerney JO, Cotton JA, Pisani D: The prokaryotic tree of life: Past,
present ... and future? Trends Ecol Evol 2008, 23:276-281.
56. Koonin EV, Wolf YI, Puigbò P: The phylogenetic forest and the quest for
the elusive tree of life. Cold Spring Harb Symp Quant Biol 2009, 74.
57. Puigbò P, Wolf YI, Koonin EV: Search for a ‘Tree of Life’ in the thicket of
the phylogenetic forest. J Biol 2009, 8:59.
58. Puigbò P, Wolf YI, Koonin EV: The tree and net components of prokaryote
evolution. Genome Biol Evol 2010, 2:745-756.
59. Wolf YI, Rogozin IB, Grishin NV, Koonin EV: Genome trees and the Tree of
Life. Trends Genet 2002, 18:472-479.
60. Ge F, Want L-S, Kim J: The cobweb of life revealed by genome-scale
estimates of horizontal gene transfer. PLoS Biol 2005, 3(10):e316.
61. Creevy CJ, Fitzpatrick DA, Philip GK, Kinsella RJ, O’Connell MJ, Pentony MM,
Travers SA, Wilkinson M, McInerney JO: Does a tree-like phylogeny only
exist at the tips in the prokaryotes? Proc R Soc Lond B 2004,
271:2551-2558.
62. Haggerty LS, Martin FJ, Fitzpatrick DA, McInerney JO: Gene and genome
trees conflict at many levels. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2209-2219.
63. Beiko RG: Gene sharing and genome evolution: Networks in trees and
tress in networks. Biol Philos 2010, 25:659-673.
64. Woese CR: On the evolution of cells. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2002,
99:8742-8747.
65. Valas RE, Bourne PE: Save the tree of life or get lost in the woods. Biol
Direct 2010, 5:44 [http://www.biology-direct.com/content/5/1/44].
66. Velasco JD: Species, genes, and the Tree of Life. Brit J Philos Sci 2010,
61:599-619.
67. Franklin-Hall LR: Trashing life’s tree. Biol Philos 2010, 25:689-709.
68. Galtier N, Daubin V: Dealing with incongruence in phylogenetic analysis.
Philos Trans R Soc B 2008, 363:4023-4029.
69. Koonin EV, Wolf YI: The fundamental units, processes and patterns of
evolution, and the tree of life conundrum. Biol Direct 2009, 4:33.
70. Doolittle WF, Bapteste E: Pattern pluralism and the Tree of Life
hypothesis. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2007, 104:2043-2049.
71. Dagan T, Martin W: Getting a better picture of microbial evolution en
route to a network of genomes. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2187-2196.
72. Beiko RG, Harlow TJ, Ragan MA: Highways of gene sharing in prokaryotes.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2005, 102:14332-14337.
73. Huang J, Gogarten JP: Ancient horizontal gene transfer can benefit
phylogenetic reconstruction. Trends Genet 2006, 22:361-366.
74. Andam CP, Williams D, Gogarten JP: Biased gene transfer mimics patterns
created through shared ancestry. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2010,
107:10679-10684.
75. Zhaxybayeva O, Doolittle WF, Papke RT, Gogarten JP: Intertwined
evolutionary histories of marine Synechococcus and Prochlorococcus
marinus. Genome Biol Evol 2009, 1:325-329.
76. Halary S, Leigh JW, Cheaib B, Lopez P, Bapteste E: Network analyses
structure genetic diversity in independent genetic worlds. Proc Natl Acad
Sci USA 2010, 107:127-132.
77. Huson DH, Scornavacca C: A survey of combinatorial methods for
phylogenetic networks. Genome Biol Evol 2010, 3:23-35.
78. Doolittle WF: At the core of the Archaea. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 1996,
93:8797-8799.
79. Doolittle WF: The practice of classification and the theory of evolution,
and what the demise of Charles Darwin’s tree of life hypothesis means
for both of them. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2221-2228.
80. Dawkins R: A Devil’s Chaplain NY: Mariner; 2003.
81. Eldredge N: Darwin: Discovering the Tree of Life NY: Norton; 2005.
82. Embley TM, Martin W: Eukaryotic evolution, changes and challenges.
Nature 2006, 440:623-630.
83. Panchen AL: Classification, Evolution, and the Nature of Biology.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1992.
84. Kell DB, Oliver SG: Here is the evidence, now what is the hypothesis? The
complementary roles of inductive and hypothesis-driven science in the
post-genomic era. BioEssays 2004, 26:99-105.
85. Rieppel O: Popper and systematics. Syst Biol 2003, 52:259-271.
86. Stamos DN: Popper, laws, and the exclusion of biology from genuine
science. Acta Biotheor 2007, 55:357-75.
87. Lakatos I: Falsification and the methodology of scientific research
programmes. In Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by: Lakatos I,
Musgrove A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1970:91-196.
88. Godfrey-Smith P: Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Science Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 2003.
O’Malley and Koonin Biology Direct 2011, 6:32
http://www.biology-direct.com/content/6/1/32
Page 20 of 21
89. Popper KR: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach Oxford:
Clarendon; 1972.
90. Sober E: The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus
Cambridge MA: MIT Press; 1984.
91. Hull DL: Certainty and circularity in evolutionary taxonomy. Evol 1967,
21:174-189.
92. Lipton P: Inference to the best explanation. In A Companion to the
Philosophy of Science. Edited by: Newton-Smith WH. London: Blackwell;
2000:184-193.
93. Oxford English Dictionary: Heuristic. Oxford English Dictionary Online [http://
www.oed.com].
94. Pólya G: How to Solve it: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method. 2 edition.
NY: Doubleday; 1957.
95. Pearl J: Heuristics: Intelligent Search Strategies for Computer Problem Solving
Reading MA: Addison-Wesley; 1984.
96. Romanycia MHJ, Pelletier FJ: What is a heuristic? Comput Intell 1985,
1:47-58.
97. Whewell W: The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon
Their History. London: John Parker; 18402.
98. Darwin C: In The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication.
Volume 2. London: John Murray; 1868.
99. Thagard P: Darwin and Whewell. Stud Hist Philos Sci 1977, 8:353-356.
100. Rieppel O: The series, the network, and the tree: Changing metaphors of
order in nature. Biol Philos 2010, 25:475-496.
101. Magnus D: Heuristics and biases in evolutionary biology. Biol Philos 1997,
12:21-38.
102. Simonson AB, Servin JA, Skophammer RG, Herbold CW, Rivera MC, Lake JA:
Decoding the genomic tree of life. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2005,
102(Suppl 1):6608-6613.
103. Galtier N: Comment on Bapteste et al. Biol Direct 2009, 4:34.
104. Doolittle WF: Response to Eric Bapteste et al. Biol Direct 2009, 4:34.
105. O’Malley MA: Construction and deconstruction: The influence of lateral
gene transfer on the evolution of the Tree of Life. In Molecular Phylogeny
of Microorganisms. Edited by: Oren A, Papke TR. Norwich: Horizon;
2010:151-166.
106. Bapteste E, Burian RM: On the need for integrative phylogenomics, and
some steps toward its creation. Biol Philos 2010, 25:711-736.
107. Norman A, Hansen LH, Sørensen SJ: Conjugative plasmids: Vessels of the
communal gene pool. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2275-2289.
108. Jain R, Rivera MC, Moore JE, Lake JA: Non-clonal evolution of microbes.
Biol J Linn Soc Lond 2003, 79:27-32.
109. Gogarten JP, Townsend JP: Horizontal gene transfer, genome innovation
and evolution. Nat Rev Microbiol 2005, 3:679-687.
110. Ragan MA, Beiko RG: Lateral genetic transfer: Open issues. Philos Trans R
Soc B 2009, 364:2241-2251.
111. Koonin EV, Wolf YI: Genomics of bacteria and archaea: the emerging
dynamic view of the prokaryotic world. Nucl Acids Res 2008, 36:6688-6719.
112. Brüssow H: The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the
living world. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2263-2274.
113. Bapteste E, Boucher Y: Epistemological aspects of horizontal gene
transfer on classification in microbiology. In Horizontal Gene Transfer:
Genomes in Flux. Edited by: Gogarten MB, Gogarten JP, Olendzenski LC. NY:
Humana; 2009:55-72.
114. Coyne J: Why Evolution is True Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2009.
115. Panchen A: Classification, Evolution and the Nature of Biology Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; 1992.
116. Peirce CS: Lectures on pragmatism (1903). In Charles Sanders Peirce: The
Collected Papers, Volume V: Pragmatism and Pramaticism. Edited by:
Hartshorne C, Weiss P. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; 1931:
[http://www.textlog.de/7664-2.html], paragraph 189.
117. Ayala FJ: Darwin and the scientific method. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2009,
106:10033-10039.
118. Andam CP, Gogarten JP: Biased gene transfer and its implications for the
concept of lineage. Biol Direct special thematic series: ‘Beyond the Tree of
Life’ .
119. Olendzenski L, Zhaxybayeva O, Gogarten JP: Horizontal gene transfer: a
new taxonomic principle? In In Horizontal Gene Transfer.. 2 edition. Edited
by: Syvanen M, Kado CI. New York: Academic Press/Elsevier; 2002:427-435.
120. Heggarty P, Maguire W, McMahon A: Splits or waves? Trees or webs?
How divergence measures and network analysis can unravel language
histories. Philos Trans R Soc B 2010, 365:3829-3843.
121. Kloesges T, Popa O, Martin W, Dagan T: Networks of gene sharing among
329 proteobacterial genomes reveal differences in lateral gene transfer
frequency at different phylogenetic depths. Mol Biol Evol 2011,
28(2):1057-74.
122. Popa O, Hazkani-Covo E, Landan G, Martin W, Dagan T: Directed networks
reveal genomic barriers and DNA repair bypasses to lateral gene
transfer among prokaryotes. Genome Res 2011, 21(4):599-609.
123. Ragan MA, McInerney JO, Lake JA: The network of life: Genome
beginnings and evolution. Philos Trans R Soc B 2009, 364:2169-2175.
124. Doolittle WF, Zhaxybayeva O: On the origin of prokaryotic species.
Genome Res 2009, 19(5):744-56.
125. Poincaré H: La Science et l’Hypothèse Paris: Flammarion; 1902.
126. Popper K: The Logic of Scientific Discovery New York: Basic Books; 1959.
127. Hempel C: Philosophy of Natural Science Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall;
1966.
128. Suppe F: The Structure of Scientific Theories Urbana: University of Illinois
Press; 1974.
doi:10.1186/1745-6150-6-32
Cite this article as: O’Malley and Koonin: How stands the Tree of Life a
century and a half after The Origin? Biology Direct 2011 6:32.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color figure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
O’Malley and Koonin Biology Direct 2011, 6:32
http://www.biology-direct.com/content/6/1/32
Page 21 of 21
